

Transatlantic To-Do List

based on discussions held at MSC events in 2022



Defense and Security

- 1
- Continue adaption of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture and quickly upgrade defense capabilities and readiness
- 2
- Reach and sustain defense spending of at least two percent of GDP as outlined in the Wales Commitments of 2014
- 3
- Future-proof the nuclear pillar of NATO, including by reassessing the deterrence posture and finding ways to include France in relevant NATO debates
- 4
- Strengthen public understanding and support for security policy, including by making the debate more inclusive
- 5
- Raise the nuclear IQ by fostering expertise, research, and broad public debates on the nuclear posture
- 6
- Promote confidence-building measures between the major nuclear powers to raise predictability and identify potential avenues for renewed arms control initiatives
- 7
- Deepen and expand EU-NATO cooperation and relevant EU-US dialogues
- 8
- Assess and prepare for the implications of the Sino-Russian strategic relationship for transatlantic security
- 9
- Advance military hardware interoperability and data sharing
- 10
- Increase coordination of procurement efforts of EU member states and boost joint procurement
- 11
- Incentivize investments in defense production capabilities by providing financing guarantees and long-term contracts
- 12
- Accelerate pipeline from commercial to military innovation, facilitate technology adoption in defense, and increase investment in software capabilities
- 13
- Fortify space assets and enhance transatlantic operational capabilities in space
- 14
- Set joint standards for the use of Emerging Disruptive Technologies and space/satellite technology
- 15
- Increase investments in joint intelligence collection and analysis capabilities and intensify cooperation between transatlantic intelligence services by expanding the “Five Eyes” standard
- 16
- Quickly ratify Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO applications and operationalize their membership
- 17
- Implement the decisions taken in the NATO Madrid Summit Declaration of June 2022, including on underappreciated initiatives such as the AP4
- 18
- Formulate ambitious targets for the July 2023 Vilnius Summit to maintain momentum on alliance reinvigoration
- 19
- Formalize the NATO-Ukraine dialogue by unblocking the NATO-Ukraine Commission
- 20
- Agree on concrete security guarantees to Ukraine, Moldova, and other “countries/regions at risk”
- 21
- Agree on an ambitious plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine, coordinate efforts, and ensure long-term support
- 22
- Increase coordinated engagement in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea region and align respective strategies and policy documents
- 23
- Support countries in the Black Sea region in increasing the resilience of their societies as well as their energy, transport, and communication infrastructure
- 24
- Promote interregional cooperation and connectivity in Central Asia and Southeast Europe
- 25
- Use initiatives like the European Political Community to upgrade the political and economic ties between the EU and its neighbors and strengthen Europe’s global role
- 26
- Strengthen NATO’s partnerships particularly to support partners at risk from Russian coercion and interference and help them reduce their vulnerabilities
- 27
- Develop tools to detect, assess, and disrupt disinformation campaigns and develop joint standard operating procedures for countering hybrid threats

Economy and Technology

- 28
- Facilitate transatlantic trade, market access, and investment, including by ratifying CETA and fostering regulatory alignment
- 29
- Map and comprehensively address the implications of the Inflation Reduction Act, the Chips Act and recent Executive Orders for transatlantic relations and the overall competitiveness of the alliance
- 30
- Increase frequency of meetings and further operationalize the Trade and Technology Council to reduce and prevent trade frictions
- 31
- Align and security-proof norm-setting and regulation, especially in economic and technology policy
- 32
- Reduce strategic dependencies on autocratic states by encouraging the diversification of supply chains, production hubs, and direct investments
- 33
- Set up a transatlantic „Article 5” mechanism for responding to economic coercion
- 34
- Deepen transatlantic coordination on sanctions policies and expand the toolbox
- 35
- Issue Ukraine Sovereignty Bonds building on the Canadian Model to provide additional funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine
- 36
- Strengthen centrality of Europe and the US in the global financial system and deepen cooperation on regulation and supervision
- 37
- Align technology export controls
- 38
- Secure critical infrastructure, including by aligning investment screening mechanisms and by bolstering cybersecurity cooperation between governments and the private sector
- 39
- Strengthen government-industry and multilateral coordination on semiconductor policy and apply lessons learnt to other key industries, including AI and quantum technologies
- 40
- Break down legal barriers that prevent transatlantic cooperation on sensitive cybersecurity issues
- 41
- Build transatlantic infrastructure to support real-time operational collaboration to counter cyber threats
- 42
- Prepare cybersecurity and encryption infrastructure for a breakthrough in quantum computing
- 43
- Increase resilience against cyberattacks by investing in joint back-up systems
- 44
- Develop joint offensive cyber capabilities and a joint cyber posture review
- 45
- Implement zero-trust cybersecurity architecture as the standard across the alliance
- 46
- Develop a joint voluntary label for “internet of things” products to increase awareness of device security and incentivize a “race to the top” in the market
- 47
- Invest in joint deepfake detection standards and processes
- 48
- Create a Transatlantic Cyber Safety Review Board on the basis of the US/Estonia model
- 49
- Defend the free and open internet, including against the introduction of national protocols or the setting of malicious norms, by operationalizing the Declaration for the Future of the Internet from April 2022

Democracy and the Rule of Law

- 50
- Systematically address vulnerabilities of the international rules-based order, democratic processes, and social cohesion, starting with fostering democratic resilience at home
- 51
- Scale up support for civil society actors around the world
- 52
- Enhance efforts to track and seek accountability for war crimes
- 53
- Deepen cooperation and intelligence-sharing on tracing and prosecuting corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit flows
- 54
- Close loopholes and increase resources to hold enablers of corruption to account, including financial and legal services
- 55
- Improve transparency including on the ownership of companies and real estate
- 56
- Cooperate on banning imports from products made with forced labor
- 57
- Increase digital literacy across the alliance and foster public discourse power vis-à-vis strategic competitors
- 58
- Embrace strategic communication to create strong pro-democratic narratives and counter anti-liberal disinformation

Relations with China

- 59
- Build on recent convergence to develop a joint understanding of the challenges posed by China, exchange best practices on how to address them, and align strategies to build counter-leverage
- 60
- Increase transatlantic coordination and European engagement in the Indo-Pacific and integrate transatlantic and transpacific China approaches
- 61
- Clearly communicate red lines regarding the future of Taiwan, freedom of navigation, disregard for basic human rights, and the weaponization of economic dependencies

- 62
- Resist Chinese efforts to use bilateral initiatives to drive wedges between transatlantic partners
- 63
- Align initiatives on de-risking and diversifying China-dependent supply chains
- 64
- Strengthen intellectual property protection, including in scientific and academic cooperation
- 65
- Coordinate policies on critical technologies, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum encryption
- 66
- Coordinate on policy and personnel questions in international institutions to balance Chinese initiatives, including in organizations like the UN Industrial Development Organization or the International Telecommunications Union
- 67
- Reduce regional dependencies on the Belt and Road Initiative by offering attractive alternatives as set out in the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative
- 68
- Encourage stronger regional alliances and coordination of China-policies in the Indo-Pacific
- 69
- Create greater opportunities for engagement with Taiwan

Relations with Russia

- 70
- Further deepen support for Ukraine and intensify primary and secondary sanctions against Russia
- 71
- Clearly communicate the purpose, costs, and limits of sanctions to the transatlantic public
- 72
- Track Russian war crimes and seek accountability, including through the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Ukraine
- 73
- Identify and freeze assets of Russian kleptocrats and prevent evasion of sanctions
- 74
- Comprehensively map out and address vulnerabilities to Russian influence and reduce one-sided dependencies
- 75
- Increase efforts to engage with the Russian public and counter state propaganda
- 76
- Develop a joint strategic understanding of post-war policies on Russia
- 77
- Create greater opportunities for engagement with post-Soviet states, including Belarus and Georgia
- 78
- Incentivize countries such as Turkey and China to use their leverage over Russia
- 79
- Recalibrate engagement on Arctic security, including in the Arctic Council, to reflect new geopolitical realities

Relations with the Global South

- 80
- Develop a transatlantic agenda on building global partnerships, including aligning the design and implementation of recent infrastructure initiatives
- 81
- Deepen business ties with countries in the Global South and begin to shift the policy framework from aid to investment
- 82
- Support the development of local value chains and downstream investments in the Global South, including in the field of green energy
- 83
- Fulfil promises made to the Global South, including on vaccines and climate finance, and proactively follow-up on the loss and damage initiative launched at COP27
- 84
- Offer debt relief and make additional funding available to developing countries
- 85
- Foster domestic support by clearly communicating the purpose and benefits of development aid to transatlantic publics and outlining investment opportunities
- 86
- Increase trust in the multilateral system by expanding diplomatic fora with the Global South and closely involving anchor countries in their design (building trust through co-design)
- 87
- Improve representation of the Global South in international organizations
- 88
- Build trust by dealing openly with accusations of double-standards and questions of reparations and restitutions
- 89
- Increase investment in cultural diplomacy towards the Global South
- 90
- Counter Russian and Chinese narratives, including on the war in Ukraine and its global effects, and discourage hedging strategies
- 91
- Provide opportunities and resources to reduce reliance on technological infrastructure at risk of malign foreign control, particularly in the technology and communication sectors

Health Security

- 92
- Promote sustained investments in pandemic preparedness and response, including through a Financial Intermediary Fund
- 93
- Invest in distributed regional manufacturing and delivery systems for vaccines in low- and middle-income countries
- 94
- Promote healthcare workforce development, exchange, and mobility
- 95
- Align and strengthen global pandemic surveillance systems

Food Security

- 96
- Scale up short-term food assistance and emergency relief
- 97
- Work together to get Ukrainian grain onto the markets, both via land and sea routes, and find a long-term solution that replaces the Agriculture Resilience Initiative (AGRI) for Ukraine
- 98
- Ramp up support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector, including investments to rebuild infrastructure, provide seeds for the next season, and train people in demining
- 99
- Promote the „Global Alliance for Food Security” through the G7
- 100
- Ensure that the World Food Programme and other aid organizations are fully funded
- 101
- Invest in the long-term transformation and resilience of the global food system, including by strengthening smallholder farmers

Climate and Energy

- 102
- Harmonize the European and US climate and energy agendas, including on carbon pricing
- 103
- Foster dialogue on reducing trade barriers and tensions related to domestic industrial policy, international trade policy, and the flow of energy transition technologies
- 104
- Work together on green technologies and energy efficiency, including by filling the “Green Technology Alliance” with life
- 105
- Set up a transatlantic dialogue on regulations and standards for clean technologies and harmonize approaches to measuring the carbon content of goods
- 106
- Coordinate efforts to manage the socio-economic repercussions of the energy transition and the current energy crisis
- 107
- Build awareness and preparedness for the challenges of an increasingly volatile energy transition amongst policymakers and the public
- 108
- Sustain transition policy continuity and political predictability to ensure alignment with public and private investments with decarbonization goals
- 109
- Increase commercial viability of green alternatives by fostering demand, de-risking investments, and facilitating deployability
- 110
- Prioritize the investment in and deployment of viable, near-term solutions while fostering technology readiness of longer-horizon technologies
- 111
- Jointly work on reducing vulnerabilities in green energy supply chains, including in critical raw materials
- 112
- Support the green transition in developing countries, including by fostering climate finance and technology transfers
- 113
- Work on a transparent monitoring mechanism showing climate finance commitments and tracking what has been spent and for which purposes
- 114
- Strengthen and align green standards of US and European global infrastructure initiatives and cooperate with the UN on connectivity projects, including in green technologies and infrastructure
- 115
- Agree on a common narrative on the strategic opportunities of climate adaptation and mitigation efforts
- 116
- Develop a joint understanding and prioritization of climate-related security threats
- 117
- Invest in data analytics capacities on climate change and its security implications and develop joint early-warning mechanisms
- 118
- Integrate climate security into international peacebuilding and crisis prevention efforts, including by creating positions for climate experts in multilateral missions
- 119
- Push for a common NATO standard on the energy transition and future self-reliance of alliance armed forces and use NATO as a platform to foster transatlantic green innovation
- 120
- Align policies on the management and protection of global commons like the international seabed

This to-do list is based on discussions held at the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, from May 9 to 11, 2022, the European Defense Roundtable in Paris on July 13, 2022, the MSC Energy Security Roundtable at the ONS Summit in Stavanger on August 28, 2022, the Roundtable on Hybrid Threats in Washington, DC, on November 1, 2022, the MSC events on the margins of COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on November 8 and 9, 2022, the Munich Leaders Meeting in Bucharest from November 27 to 29, 2022, and the Munich Strategy Retreat Elmau at Schloss Elmau from December 4 to 6, 2022. It is neither intended as a ranking of priorities nor an exhaustive list, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of the Munich Security Conference. Please consider it as a collection of views meant to further the debate on some of the most critical security challenges of our times.